Abstract. We present HM-ABE, a hierarchical multi-authority attributebased encryption scheme with policy delegation, that generalizes current work significantly. Current methods require encryptors to build ciphertext access policies themselves, using attributes published by authority domains. This causes problems, both since authorities may not publish sensitive attributes, and since users may not understand their internal policies. We permit encryptors to delegate parts of their access policies to authorities, who can construct appropriate policies on their behalf, using sensitive attributes, if needed. Delegation can be recursive. Delegation helps encryptors build more accurate access policies, especially when they must include attributes from multiple authorities. HM-ABE greatly reduces the chances that ineligible users gain access to data, or that eligible users are denied. Delegation lets authorities hide sensitive attributes, while still allowing users indirect access to their semantics. We show that HM-ABE achieves recursive attribute delegation, selective attribute hiding, and prove that it is secure.
Introduction
Standard public-key encryption associates a ciphertext with a single public key, so only users holding the matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext. Attribute-Based encryption (ABE) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] is a more powerful approach that permits expressive ciphertext access policies defining which combinations of attributes empower users to decrypt ciphertexts. Access policies in ABE can incorporate multiple attributes, and, or and threshold gates. In Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [1, 7] , each user holds a set of attributes, and each ciphertext is associated with an access policy, expressed as a Boolean formula over attributes. A central authority (CA) publishes the public key corresponding to each attribute, for use by encryptors in creating ciphertexts. Each user is granted a capability (which we call a warrant) corresponding to each attribute she holds by the authority maintaining the attribute. Only decryptors whose attributes satisfy the access policy can decrypt the ciphertext.
But every coin has two sides. Expressive policies facilitate fine-grained access control but make policy building difficult. Current CP-ABE schemes are hard to use and error-prone; they require encryptors, who may be common end-users, to master complex policy-making rules, and build policies themselves. Patients building access policies for encrypted Personal Health Records (PHRs), for example, must specify who may decrypt these PHRs through carefully crafted Boolean expressions over user attributes. However, patients may not have enough medical knowledge to build right access policies.
The emergence of Multi-authority Attribute-Based Encryption (M-ABE) [8] [9] [10] [11] complicates matters considerably. M-ABE permits multiple authorities, each maintaining its own set of attributes, and publishing public keys for them. Each authority is allowed to have its own rules for how its attributes are to be used in building policies. Encryptors in M-ABE may have to build policies consistent across several domains, and must master internal rules for these authorities. This is hard even for experts, and simply impossible for most users.
Another problem of current M-ABE schemes is that authorities may see some attributes as too sensitive to publish public keys or policy building rules for these attributes. Consider some companies cooperate to provide services to a large number of customers, who for privacy reasons, submit encrypted requests for service. Each company has its own authority and maintains its attributes. Customers' access polices may contain attributes from several authorities. In a standard implementation of M-ABE, customers would directly encode, in the access policy for each request, the attributes of the service personnel (or groups) responsible for handling that request. But this is clearly unreasonable. Customers should not be required to understand the details of how each type of request is handled within each company. This approach also leaks information on each company's internal processes and structures, perhaps even compromises trade secrets.
Access policies based on the Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) of [12] are currently regarded as the most expressive [2, 7] . In current M-ABE schemes, only [8, 13] support such access policies.
Our Contributions
We present a new Hierarchical Multi-Authority ABE scheme (HM-ABE) based on decentralized ABE (DABE) [8] to address these issues. We preserve all of DABE's advantages, and enhance it, adding policy delegation and attribute hiding.
Policy delegation allows an encryptor to delegate the task of building part of her policy to a trusted authority, using attributes it controls. Authorities in HM-ABE may publish delegated attributes, to serve as placeholders for access policies delegated to them. Encryptors can use delegated attributes in their policies. Authorities then build their own sub-policies to replace such delegated attributes. Encryptors securely send high-level descriptions of their intended policies to these authorities so they can build the right sub-policies. Such descriptions are high-level and non-formal, and sufficient only for policy-building. Attribute hiding in HM-ABE lets authorities safeguard sensitive attributes by selectively publishing or hiding any of their local attributes. No public key is published for a hidden attribute, and only the authority managing the hidden attribute can use the hidden attribute's public key in encryption. Only decryptors explicitly authorized with the warrant for a hidden attribute can recognize it in polices. Encryptors access hidden attributes indirectly through policy delegation. Authorities can use policy delegation to use sensitive attributes in internal sub-policies, without their becoming public.
HM-ABE is significantly harder to prove correct than DABE, since the security game used in the proof is more complex, and HM-ABE supports recursive delegation. Nonetheless, we succeed in proving that HM-ABE is secure, even given a more powerful adversary.
HM-ABE is the only M-ABE scheme having features such as policy delegation, and attributing hiding. HM-ABE is based on DABE, and supports LSSSbased access policies too. [13] is another M-ABE scheme supports LSSS-based policies, but it does not have the other features of HM-ABE. Other M-ABE schemes [9, 11] do not even support LSSS-based access policies. Besides, schemes like [9, 13] require the existence of trusted CA(s) which cannot be corrupted, while our scheme and DABE do not have this restriction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model of HM-ABE appears in Sec. 2. Sec. 3 discusses preliminaries. We describe the differences between HM-ABE and DABE in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 presents our scheme. Related work appears in Sec. 7. Sec. 8 concludes the paper. We present the security proof of HM-ABE in Appendix.
Overview of Our Scheme
Our scheme consists of two kinds of entities: users and authorities. Users may be encryptors or decryptors, and are known by global user identifiers (UIDs). Users have attributes, which are numbered. Authorities manage attributes and their assignment to users. They publish public keys for open attributes for encryptors to use. Open attributes can be used in an access policy by any encryptor. Nothing is published for hidden attributes. A hidden attribute may be used only by the authority managing it, in its sub-policies. For each attribute i that it manages, an authority generates a master secret key σ i , and publishes the matching public key π i if i is open. If user UID holds attribute i, he gets a warrant ϖ UID,i from the authority managing attribute i. The authority computes ϖ UID,i from σ i and UID.
Authorities also handle delegation requests sent from encryptors or other authorities. Encryptors build policies using attributes they know, and encrypt their data based on these policies. Decryptors will decrypt ciphertexts using warrants they have been granted.
Attributes may be regular or delegated . Regular attributes describe users, and correspond to attributes as in current M-ABE schemes. A delegated attribute serves as a proxy for the sub-policy an authority designs for an encryptor or another authority. Encryptors may indirectly use hidden attributes through using delegated attributes in their policies since authorities can build sub-policies including their hidden attributes. Fig. 1 shows the model of HM-ABE. Let rattr i and dattr j denote regular attribute i and delegated attribute j. Policies are encoded as access structures, which are boolean formulas over attributes. Access trees are equivalent structures, whose leaves are attributes and internal nodes are and or or gates. The access structure created by the encryptor is called the main access structure.
In Fig. 1 , the encryptor has specified the main access structure (rattr 1 or dattr 2 ) and (rattr 3 and dattr 4 ). She first obtains attribute public keys stored publicly, and encrypts the data with the public keys of regular attributes rattr 1 and rattr 3 . She publishes these ciphertexts, say in the cloud. Decryptors holding rattr 3 cannot decrypt the ciphertext, since they hold no warrant for the delegated attribute dattr 4 . They must wait for AU 2 to replace dattr 4 by a sub-policy.
The encryptor then solicits the help of AU 1 and AU 2 , sending them descriptions of her desired policy, encrypted with the public keys of delegated attributes dattr 2 and dattr 4 , respectively. AU 1 and AU 2 may receive different policy descriptions. Each of them decrypts the description, and builds access sub-policies appropriate to its domain, in the form of access sub-structures or access subtrees. Each authority creates the ciphertext for its sub-structure, and sends the ciphertext to the cloud. Delegated attributes are replaced by the corresponding access sub-structures. dattr 2 is replaced by (rattr 5 or dattr 6 ) within AU 1 , and dattr 4 by (rattr 7 and rattr 8 ) within AU 2 . Here rattr 8 is a hidden attribute. A delegated attribute in an access sub-structure can also be replaced by a sub-structure. Thus, dattr 6 is replaced by (rattr 9 and rattr 10 ) within AU 3 . The ciphertext is now associated with a more complex access structure called a complete access structure containing thirteen nodes, while the main structure contained only seven. Moreover, the new policy uses hidden attributes, which are unavailable to the encryptor without delegation.
A user satisfies an access structure under the following conditions. Each attribute in the access structure is treated as a Boolean true if and only if it is also held by the user. The access structure is satisfied if and only if the corresponding Boolean expression evaluates to true.
Preliminaries and Overview

Access Structures
U is monotone if whenever B ⊆ C and B ∈ A, we also have C ∈ A.
Definition 1
An access structure is a monotone collection A of non-empty subsets of U. The sets in A are the authorized sets. All other sets are unauthorized .
Bilinear Maps
Let G and G T denote two multiplicative cyclic groups of order N . In HM-ABE, N is the product of three distinct primes. Let g be a generator of G, and e : G × G → G T be a bilinear map with the following properties:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G.
Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)
We use the definitions of LSSS in [12] : [Av] x is the secret share belonging to attribute ρ(x). [8] shows how to obtain A and ρ from A.
Every LSSS Λ = (A, ρ) has the linear reconstruction property. Let S ∈ A be an authorized set, and I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , l} be defined as
If {λ x } x∈I are the shares of s corresponding to attributes in S, we have ∑ x∈I c x λ x = s. These c x can be found in time polynomial in the size of the matrix A.
Outline Of DABE
We briefly describe DABE [8] . Let p 1 , p 2 , p 3 be three distinct large primes, and N = p 1 p 2 p 3 . Let G and G T denote two cyclic groups of order N , and
is used in the construction of DABE. The other groups are used in proofs. Let g 1 be a generator of G p1 . Define ε = e(g 1 , g 1 ). DABE operates as follows. Let A be an access structure. Let T be its access tree form, with its leaves representing attributes.
The Basic Idea A encryptor E encrypts message M by choosing a random secret s ∈ Z N and obtain M 's ciphertext as C M = M ε s . Any user who can recover ε s can recover M = C M /ε s . DABE implements the policy encoded into T by using it to dictate who can recover ε s , as follows. Let Λ = (A, ρ) be an LSSS matching T's structure. If ε s is shared under Λ, the linear reconstruction property guarantees efficiently computable c x , λ x for each attribute ρ(x) represented by a leaf in T, such that ∑ x∈I c x λ x = s for any authorized set S and corresponding I = {x : ρ(x) ∈ S}. Since Λ is public, any user can efficiently compute the c x from A.
Let us give ε λx to each user holding attribute ρ(x). A user who holds all the attributes in an authorized set S can compute {c x } x∈I from A, followed by ∏
Hence, he can recover ε s and subsequently, message M , if and only if he holds all attributes in an authorized set.
Preventing Collusions This method is secure against individual users, but if users who can jointly cover an authorized set S collude, they can recover ε s by pooling ε λx values. Collusions are prevented by encoding user UIDs with the attribute "shares" ε λx as follows. Let 0 be shared under Λ, and the share corresponding to attribute ρ(x) be ω x . Let H denote a hash function that maps global identities UID to elements of
. Since the ω x are all shares of 0 under Λ, ∑ x∈I ω x c x = 0, and the above expression reduces to ε s . However, collusion between users U, V is now ruled out, since ε λx ε ωx U and ε
V do not combine in the above manner.
Setup:
Let A denote the adversary and C denote the challenger. C initializes a set U of attributes and a set S of authorities. A selects a set S ′ ⊂ S of corrupted authorities. A gets public keys of all attributes. 
From DABE to HM-ABE
We choose DABE as the base to build our scheme, and encryption and decryption in our scheme mirror DABE. The security games of HM-ABE are significantly more complex than those of DABE because of our added features. Proving these features are secure is difficult. We describe how to achieve our new features in DABE to obtain HM-ABE in the following.
Handling Delegation
As shown in Sec. 3.4, a decryptor needs to combine all U-shares of attributes in an authorized set to generate ε s . Since a policy may incorporate sub-policies from several authorities, we must ensure U-shares can be combined correctly, whether they originate from the encryptor or from various authorities.
We solve this problem differently from DABE. In both schemes, the encryptor creates a ciphertext using a secret s, and generates shares λ x and ω x of s for each attribute ρ(x) used in the access policy. In DABE, these shares are embedded into the policy ciphertext, but not passed directly to any entity. In contrast, we pass both λ x , ω x for a delegated attribute ρ(x) directly to the authority that controls ρ(x).
Say encryptor E delegates a sub-policy to authority AU j via delegated attribute δ. E encrypts message M with secret s, specifying δ in his LSSS Λ = (A, ρ). Let ρ(x) = δ. He creates a policy description Pol M,δ , gets the attribute shares λ x , ω x , and encrypts Pol M,δ , λ x , ω x by δ's public key π δ . Then the encrypted message is sent to AU j . Please note here that E directly gives secrets λ x , ω x to AU j , while in DABE, the adversary can only recover a U-share s ⟨U,δ⟩ = ε λx ε ωx U for any user ID U . AU j creates a local access structure A j and LSSS Λ j for this delegation, in line with Pol M,δ and AU j 's policies, and shares λ x , ω x under Λ j . As Section 5 shows, a decryptor U who satisfies the access structure A j can recover s ⟨U,δ⟩ . Delegation can be recursive.
Directly giving authorities secret shares λ x , ω x enables policy delegation but complicates the security game. The boxed figure Game 1 shows the overall structure of the security games of DABE and HM-ABE. They are different in the challenge phase, where the adversary obtains secret shares λ x , ω x of delegated attributes controlled by corrupted authorities in the security game of HM-ABE while he cannot in the security game of DABE. We must prove that HM-ABE is secure even if the adversary is more powerful.
Another challenge is that HM-ABE allows hierarchical delegation, so one authority may delegate a policy to another authority. This feature does not exist in DABE. We must prove that hierarchical delegation does not compromise security. We prove this in two steps in Appendix. First, we prove that HM-ABE is secure when no delegation is allowed. We show in this case that it is safe to release λ x and ω x to authorities. Next, we prove inductively that HM-ABE is secure with an arbitrary number of recursive delegations.
Handling Hidden Attributes
We achieve attribute hiding by modifying the function ρ for hidden attributes as follows. For each row [A] x in A, if x is associated with an open attribute i, ρ(x) will map x to the corresponding attribute's ID ρ(x) = i. Let C M be the main ciphertext and h C () be a hash function. If x is associated with a hidden attribute i, we define ρ(x) = h C (C M ||i), where || denotes concatenation. Only users holding the warrant for i are given i's ID, and can know that the row x is associated with attribute i.
Construction of HM-ABE
For convenience, we associate an attribute v with each node v in an access tree T. If v is a leaf, v is a regular or delegated attribute. If v is an internal node, v is a virtual attribute, which we will find useful in the exposition. The root of tree T is associated with the virtual attribute T. As described in Sec. 3, we apply linear secret sharing over access structures defined over attributes, ensuring that a user can recover a secret only if he has U-shares for all attributes in some authorized set.
Definition 4 A user U satisfies an access tree T for a secret encryption key
Notation and Algorithms
Let O j and C j be the set of open and hidden attributes managed by authority AU j , and let
be the set of all open attributes, and R, D ⊆ O be the set of regular and delegated attributes, respectively. Let A and A j denote the main access structure created by the encryptor and the sub-structure created by AU j . Let Λ = (A, ρ) and Λ j = (A j , ρ j ) denote LSSS schemes defined for A and A j , respectively.
For each attribute i, we create a pair (σ i , π i ), where σ i is a master secret key and π i is an attribute public key.
be the set of secret keys and public keys for all attributes AU j manages. Let Π = ∪ Π j be the set of all public keys. We use the following algorithms. g 1 , g 1 ) αi , g χi 1 ) are published. If i is hidden, its public key and ID will not be published, but a hash h C (C M ||i) is published in encryption, as described in Section 3.4.
Global Initialization
Warrants
χi . Warrants are used to recover the U-shares s ⟨D,i⟩ . If i is hidden, the user holding the warrant for i also gets attribute i's ID. (g1, g1) s . For each attribute i = ρ(x) in the access structure A, compute the triple (Y1,x, Y2,x, Y3,x) , and store with the leaf in T corresponding to attribute i.
Main Encryption Algorithm
How D decrypts ciphertext CM :
For each attribute i = ρ(x) that D holds in access tree T, use warrant ϖD,i to decrypt the triple (Y1,x, Y2,x, Y3,x) to get the U-share s ⟨D,i⟩ . Aggregate the s ⟨D,i⟩ , proceeding up the tree, and recover e(g1, g1)
Algorithm 1: Outline of Encryption and Decryption.
We generate C M , the actual ciphertext for M , as well as a triple (Y 1,x , Y 2,x , Y 3,x ) for each regular attribute i = ρ(x) in A. These triples will yield the U-shares s ⟨D,i⟩ for each attribute i when decrypted with the warrant ϖ D,i , and are associated with the leaf of the access tree T corresponding to attribute i.
Encryptor's use of Delegation Let encryptor E's policy use attribute δ delegated by AU j . Let Pol M,δ be a description of the policy E delegates to AU j via δ under the LSSS Λ = (A, ρ). Let ρ(x) = δ. E chooses a random q x ∈ Z N and encrypts ∆ M,δ = {Pol M,δ ||(λ x , ω x )} with a new generated symmetric key 
Processing delegations Let authority AU j receive the encrypted delegation messages Y 
There is no C M . U-shares are our only concern. 
Decryption algorithm Let
D generates the U-share for an open regular attribute i from ciphertexts in Eqns. 1 and 2 and his warrant ϖ D,i . Let ρ(x) = i. Following DABE [8] ,
For a delegated attribute δ where ρ(x) = δ, let Λ j = (A j , ρ j ) be the LSSS for the sub-structure A j replacing δ. attributes c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t , he holds the warrants {ϖ D,c k |k = 1, . . . , t} and IDs {c k |k = 1, . . . , t}. First, D computes h C (C M ||c k ) for each c k . If there is a match, he infers the warrant ϖ D,i , and uses Eqn. 9 to generates the proper U-share. Unless a decryptor already holds i's ID, he learns nothing about which hidden attribute was used by the encryptor. Delegated attributes within A j are handled recursively using Eqn. 8.
Security Analysis
We first prove that it is safe to release secret shares to authorities when no delegation is allowed in HM-ABE, then we prove inductively that HM-ABE is secure with an arbitrary number of recursive delegations.
Security Model
We fix the security parameter κ at the outset. We show the security of HM-ABE by considering a series of games G i between an adversary A and a challenger C.
In the boxed figure Game 1, A creates two messages M 0 and M 1 . C picks random bit β, encrypts M β , and sends it to A, who makes a guess β ′ for β. 
Definition 6
A satisfies an access tree T for an encryption key s if A controls a UID that satisfies T.
Definition 7 An encryption scheme is secure if all polynomial-time adversaries have only a negligible advantage in its security game G.
Assumptions
Our proofs are based on a set of assumptions, and assume the inability of a polynomial algorithm to distinguish between certain tuples (D, T 1 ) and (D, T 2 ) with non-negligible advantage. We say that a polynomial-time algorithm A's advantage in distinguishing tuples (D, T 1 ) and (D, T 2 ) is
We follow the group construction in Sec. 5.1. Below, we adapt the assumptions in [8] . 
from tuple (D, T 2 ) with non-negligible advantage, the probability being taken over random choices of 
and (D, T 2 ) with non-negligible advantage, the probability being taken over the random choice of g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , a, b, c, T 1 , T 2 , and the random bits consumed by A.
Proof of Security
Let G i denote the security game parameterized as i, and A(G i ) denote A's advantage in game G i . Our proof is based on the following security games.
G R DABE's security game. Delegation forbidden. A(G R ) is known to be negligible [8] . G R ′ Security game G R modified so C gives A all secret shares {λ x , ω x } of attribute ρ(x) controlled by corrupted authorities. The access structure contains regular attributes only. Delegation forbidden. G Ln Security game of HM-ABE when the access tree is of n-level delegation.
Boxed figure Game 1 shows the general structure of these games. We first prove that A(G R ′ ) is negligible. We next show A(G L1 ) − A(G R ′ ) is negligible, so that A(G L1 ) is also negligible. We then prove by induction that A(G Ln ) is negligible for any n > 1.
Proof that A(G R ′ ) is negligible Theorem 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, every polynomial time adversary has negligible advantage in G R ′ .
We have two games G1, G2. If there is a polynomial-time adversary A such that A(G1) − A(G2) = ϵ, we can use A to construct a polynomial-time challenger C with advantage ϵ in breaking one of Assumptions 1-4.
Challenger C is given the tuple (D, T ), which he uses to generate keys, ciphertexts and other parameters to simulate a game. T is either T1 or T2, but not known to C, who simulates G1 if T = T1, and G2 otherwise.
In the challenge phase, A sends two messages M0, M1 and an access structure he cannot satisfy to C. C randomly selects β ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts M β under the access structure and sends the encrypted M β back to A. Proof. The boxed figure Game 1 shows the differences between G R and G R ′ . We enhance the proof of G R in [8] to prove that A(G R ′ ) is negligible, even when A is more powerful. The major technique we use is dual system encryption which is a new proof technique based on the idea of semi-functional keys and ciphertexts [14] . The security game G R ′ is identical to the generic game in box figure Game 1, except that the access structure A in the Challenge Phase uses no delegated attributes. We define following games to prove A(G R ′ ) is negligible.
The queried ϖ UID,i are type-2 semifunctional keys for the first j − 1 UIDs, and a type-1 semi-functional key for the jth UID. Other ϖ UID,i are normal. G j, 2 The ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. The queried ϖ UID,i are type-2 semi-functional keys for the first j UIDs. Other ϖ UID,i are normal. G final The ciphertext is a semi-functional encrypted random message. All queried ϖ UID,i are type-2 semi-functional keys.
We first prove that the differences between A(G R ′ ) and 1,2 ) and A(G j,1 ), A(G j,1 ) and A(G j,2 ) , A(G q,2 ) and A(G final ) are all negligible. Since A(G final ) = 0, we prove A(G R ′ ) is negligible. Due to space limitation, we only show the proof of Lemma 6.
We give the overview of our proof for Lemma 2 to 6 in the box figure Proof. 1.
Lemma 2 Let there exist a polynomial time algorithm A with
We can then construct a polynomial time algorithm C with advantage ϵ in breaking Assumption 1. Proof sketch. In the Setup Phase, C receives N , g 1 , T . Phase 1 proceeds as in Game 1.
Lemma 3 Let there exists a polynomial time algorithm
In the Challenge Phase, let B andB denote the subset of rows in A corresponding to attributes managed by corrupted authorities, and good authorities, respectively. C constructs semi-functional ciphertext for B andB, exactly as in Lemma 8 of [8] . C sends the resulting ciphertext and shares
Phase 2 proceeds as in Game 1. As Lemma 8 in [8] shows, the ciphertext is randomly distributed. A obtains all shares from corrupt authorities and some additional shares from good authorities in Phases 1 When T ∈ G p1 , C simulates G R ′ , and if T ∈ G, C will simulate G 0 with probability negligibly close to 1. We conclude that C can use A to obtain advantage negligibly close to 0 in breaking Assumption 1. 
Lemma 4 Let there exist a polynomial time algorithm
1 . Please note e(g 1 , g 3 ) = 1. Phase 1 proceeds as in Game 1. The warrants ϖ UID,i are constructed as in Lemma 11 of [8] .
In the Challenge Phase, C picks a bit β, and computes
abc , this ciphertext corresponds to encryption with the secret key s = abc. We construct the triples (Y 1,x , Y 2,x , Y 3,x ) just as in [8] . Now, C must send to A shares λ x , ω x of s = abc for attributes ρ(x) managed by corrupted authorities. However, C does not know s = abc. As per the proof in [8] From Lemma 2 to 6, we prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 7 If
A cannot satisfy access tree T in G R ′ , the probability of his obtaining T's root U-share is negligible.
Proof. By Theorem 1, if A cannot satisfy access tree T in G R ′ , his advantage in A(G R ′ ) is negligible. By Definition 7, the encryption system which G R ′ is based on is hence secure. Hence, A only has negligible advantage in decrypting the ciphertext, or equivalently, in obtaining the U-share of T's root.
Proof that A(G Ln ) is negligible
We show that A's advantage in G L1 is negligible, and proceed by induction. We define
, the access structure may include delegated attributes, and 1-level delegation is allowed. Unlike
gets secret shares of each attribute controlled by corrupted authorities, regardless it is regular or delegated. In the Challenge Phase, A creates a complete access structure A * , which includes the main access structure and all level-1 access sub-structures {A j }. C encrypts M β under A * and sends the resulting ciphertext to A. C also sends shares λ x , ω x of attributes managed by corrupted authorities to A. Phase 2 is identical to that in Game 1.
Lemma 8 Any polynomial time adversary
Since A cannot satisfy A * , he cannot satisfy its access tree T * . By construction, T * uses 1-level delegation. Let T 0 be the main access tree with access subtrees eliminated. T 0 uses no delegation. A fails to satisfy T * in two cases. In the first case, A is unable to satisfy a leaf associated with a regular attribute on T 0 , so that A still only has negligible advantage in game G R ′ played with the challenge access tree T 0 . Hence, A only has negligible advantage in G L ′
1
. In the second case, A satisfies all regular attributes in T 0 , but fails to satisfy a leaf on some subtree T δ of T * . Let T δ 's root be v δ . By Lemma 7, A's advantage ϵ ′ in obtaining v δ 's U-share is negligible. If A cannot obtain v δ 's U-share, he cannot satisfy T 0 , and A(G R ′ ) = ϵ is negligible with the challenge access tree T 0 .
Let v δ and v δ , respectively, be the events that A can and cannot obtain v δ 's U-share. We have Pr[
) is negligible. The ≤ arises because A may fail to satisfy several subtrees simultaneously.
Lemma 9 Any polynomial-time adversary has only negligible advantage in
G L1 . Proof. A obtains more information in G L ′ 1 than in in G L1 , so that A(G L ′ 1 ) ≥ A(G L1 ).
Lemma 10 Any polynomial-time adversary has only negligible advantage in
Proof. We first assume that A has only negligible advantage in G Ln−1 . Setup and Phase 1 in G Ln are exactly as in Game 1. The Challenge Phase proceeds as in Game 1. The challenge access structure A * includes the main access structure and all access sub-structures {A j }. In addition to the ciphertext for M β , C sends shares λ x , ω x of attributes managed by corrupted authorities to A. Phase 2 proceeds as in Game 1. A outputs a guess β ′ of β.
Since A cannot satisfy A * , he cannot satisfy its access tree T n , which uses n-level delegation. Let T n−1 represent the first n − 1 levels of delegation in T n , with the last delegation level eliminated. A fails to satisfy T n in two cases. First, a leaf associated with a regular attribute on T n−1 is not satisfied, so that A only has a negligible advantage in game G Ln−1 with the challenge access tree T n−1 . Hence, A only has a negligible advantage in G Ln . In the second case, A satisfies all regular attributes in T n−1 , but fails to satisfy a leaf in some subtree T δ corresponding to a delegated attribute δ occurring as a leaf in T n−1 . Let T δ 's root be v δ ∈ T n−1 .
By Lemma 7, A only has a negligible advantage ϵ ′ in obtaining v δ 's U-share that can be used to obtain T's root's U-share. When A cannot obtain v δ 's Ushare, he cannot satisfy the access tree T n−1 , and A(G Ln−1 ) = ϵ is negligible with the challenge access tree T n−1 . 
Related Work
Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), the first attribute based encryption scheme, was proposed in [15] . Fuzzy IBE evolved from the IBE scheme in [16, 17] . Being a precursor scheme, fuzzy IBE does not support very expressive access policies. Schemes such as KP-ABE [2] and CP-ABE [1] are more expressive. In KP-ABE, each ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. Each user's private key is associated with an access structure, which is an access tree where attributes are leaves and internal nodes are threshold gates. A user can decrypt a ciphertext when the ciphertext's attributes satisfy the user's access structure. In [1] , KP-ABE is transformed into CP-ABE. User private key is associated with attributes and each ciphertext is associated with an access structure. A user can decrypt a ciphertext if the attributes that the user has can satisfy the ciphertext's access structure.
Predicate encryption [18] is an ABE scheme achieving policy hiding. A user evaluates whether he satisfies a ciphertext's access policy, by decrypting the ciphertext. Whether this decryption succeeds or fails, he does not learn what the access policy is. However, this scheme does not allow expressive access policies.
The first multi-authority scheme, proposed in [9] , recognizes k attribute authorities (AA), each maintaining a disjoint attribute set. This scheme still requires a trusted CA to combine secret shares to prevent collusion attacks. Unless the CA or all AAs are compromised, the system is secure. Access structures in this scheme are not very expressive. Chase and Chow later proposed an improved scheme in [10] to remove the requirement of the CA.
This M-ABE scheme in [8] allows each ciphertext to be associated with an LSSS-based access structure containing attributes from different authorities. Each user has a global identifier. An authority generates a private key for an (attribute, identity) pair. Users obtain private keys matching their attributes and identities from authorities. The scheme is secure unless all authorities are
